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Abstract
Multicultural society as a way of being-with-others needs a certain form of 
public reasoning. Unfortunately, the current yet dominant form of public 
reasoning is infiltrated by biases from occidental culture. This mode of reasoning 
does nothing but uproot participants from their cultural identity for the sake 
of universal consensus. Multicultural society, however, consists of identities 
which are embedded in the individuals’ cultural tradition. This sociological 
fact demands a richer form of rationality that does not deny the multiplicity of 
cultural values and embedded identities. We need a form of public reasoning 
which emphasizes cultural understanding rather than abstract consensus. We 
might call it a multicultural, contextualized and other-regarding form of public 
reason. 
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Social thinker Bhikhu Parekh argues that the last four decades of the twentieth 
century witnessed the emergence of a cluster of intellectual and political 
movements led by such diverse groups as indigenous peoples, national 
minorities, ethno-cultural nations, old and new immigrants, feminists, gay 
men and lesbians, and the greens (Parekh 2000: 1). They promote practices, 
life-styles, views, and ways of life that are different from, disapproved of, and 
in varying degrees denied by the dominant culture. Although too disparate 
to share a common philosophical and political agenda, they are all united in 
resisting the wider society’s homogenizing or assimilationist thrust based on 
the belief that there is only one correct, true, or normal way to understand 
and structure life’s social, cultural, and political areas. 
Multiculturalism is essentially a philosophy-based political agenda that 
demands the recognition of the multiplicity of cultural values. Multiculturalism 
emphasizes the need to recognize that each culture is a community of values 
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with its own way of thinking and being. The key objective of multiculturalism 
is political and societal sustainability. This objective, however, cannot be 
easily achieved as some commitments to values are so fundamental that they 
curtail the probability of consensus. For some thinkers of modernity, this issue 
is quite intriguing since the dream of modernity cannot be negotiated with 
politics of identity. Modernity insists that the public realm must be secured 
from sectarian values and governed by nothing but public values all citizens 
consent to. 
Modern thinker Jurgen Habermas, proposes some kind of idealized form 
of rationality to warrant the possibility of consensus in the public sphere, 
namely communicative rationality. His communicative rationality, however, 
is severely criticized by many thinkers who have abandoned the universal 
dream of modernity. I would contend that Habermas’ proposed rationality 
itself is rooted in post-Renaissance European intellectual culture that involves 
a particular mode of truth, reason, and reality. Habermas’ communicative 
rationality is, in fact, an occidental rationality that uproots individuals from 
their cultural identity. Multiculturalism needs a richer form of rationality 
that, unlike Habermas’ rationality, accepts the multiplicity of cultural values 
in the name of pseudo universality. This article tries to uncover the hidden 
assumption behind Habermas’ communicative rationality in order to propose 
a new mode of rationality that is more commensurate with multiculturalism. 
First, I will try to reformulate multiculturalism as value pluralism that most 
likely denies reasoned consensus. Second, I will elaborate further how 
Habermas’ communicative rationality is in fact the embodiment of post-
Renaissance European Western cultural values. Third, I will theoretically 
pursue new forms of relationships between rationality and identity in a 
multicultural society. 
Multiculturalism and value pluralism
The enemies of multiculturalism include singularity, essentialism, and 
universalism. Multiculturalism is a philosophy of radical difference. As 
a philosophy of radical difference, multiculturalism denies the universal 
commensurability of cultures or values in the name of universal humanity. 
One of multiculturalism’s basic tenets is anti essentialism. Culture is not a 
substance. It is not what poet Matthew Arnold says about “the best which 
has been thought and said in the world”, a “study of perfection, harmonious 
and general” (Mulhern, 2000: xvi). Culture is more about what philosopher 
Herder has in mind about human groups’ symbolic forms of life, shaped in 
diverse conditions and growing into new shapes as these forms encounter 
new demands and opportunities (Mulhern 2000: xvi). 
As a philosophy of radical difference, multiculturalism can be paralleled 
with value pluralism. Multiculturalism as a philosophy claims that there 
are multiplicities of incommensurable values. In order to understand value 
pluralism we have to differentiate it from ethical pluralism. Ethical pluralism 
is a thesis that argues that there is no such thing as a single ethical standard to 
354 355Wacana Vol. 13 No. 2 (October 2011) DONNY GAHRAL ADIAN, Reasoning in a multicultural society
which all principles of conduct must conform. According to ethical pluralism, 
a number of ethical principles are equally fundamental. Value pluralism 
intends to go beyond that. Originating in Isaiah Berlin’s philosophy, it is 
a thesis that claims that fundamental human values are irreducibly plural 
and incommensurable (Crowder 2002: 2). In other words, values can be in 
conflict, and there is no rationally determinable answer to the question which 
values should take precedence. Value conflict is inarbitrable. For instance, the 
value of utility can be inarbitrably in conflict with the values of care, liberty, 
or impartiality. There is no way we can appeal to a super-value to be able to 
integrate them. Berlin wrote in his major work Four Essays on Liberty (1969): 
If as I believe, the ends of men are many, and not all of them are in principle 
compatible with each other, then the possibility of conflict—and of tragedy—
can never wholly be eliminated from human life, either personal or social. The 
necessity of choosing between absolute claims is then an inescapable characteristic 
of human condition. This gives value to freedom as Acton had conceived of it—as 
an end in itself… (Berlin 1969: 169).
Value pluralism stresses the diversity of ends of life. It is a form of 
antirationalism that insists that our reason is incapable to provide a single 
agreed-upon answer to the question, “what is the best way to live?” There 
are innumerable ways of living that appeal to each of us but they conflict and 
we are often unable to decide among them. 
There are four fundamental principles of value pluralism (Crowder 2002: 
2). They are universal values, pluralism, incommensurability, and conflict. I 
would like to elaborate on each of them further. 
A. Universal values
Value pluralism holds that values are trans-historical and cross-cultural. 
This standpoint differs from that held by ethical relativism that claims 
that all values are the products of particular cultures and perspectives and 
possess ethical force only relative to that particular perspective. The claim 
of universality could be understood as values that are valuable for people’s 
well-being or flourishing irrespective of what particular persons or cultures 
may believe. This is not to say, however, that these values can be identified 
without reference to any actual patterns of belief and practice. There are 
commonalities among the beliefs and practices of most human societies such 
that certain values, or at least the capability of realizing those values, must be 
seen as promoting the flourishing of any form of human life. 
B. Plurality
Value pluralists believe that values, including universal values, are plural. This 
claim of plurality, however, must consider the types of values. There are two 
types of values: primary and secondary values. Primary or substantive values 
are universal, while secondary values vary with persons, societies, traditions, 
and historical periods. Nussbaum lists the substantive content of universal 
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values as “central functional capabilities necessary for human flourishing” 
(Nussbaum 2000: 70). These capabilities are as follows: 
Being able to live the end of human life of normal length; to enjoy good health, 
including reproductive health, adequate nourishment and shelter; to enjoy bodily 
integrity, including security against assault and freedom of movement; to use 
the senses, to imagine, think and reason; to have emotional attachments to things 
and people outside ones selves; to form a conception of good and to engage in 
critical reflection about the planning of our life; to live with and toward others, 
to engage in social interaction, and to have ‘the social bases of self respect and 
non-humiliation’; to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants and 
the world of nature; to laugh, play and enjoy recreational activities; to participate 
effectively in political choices that govern our life; and to have a real opportunity 
to hold property (Nussbaum 2000: 78-80).
The substantive values enlisted above are plural in the sense that they are 
contingent and open ended. It means that we must allow for the possibility 
of changes in the natural circumstances of human beings, and for the need to 
revise the list in order to reflect what we may yet have to learn from encounters 
with other human societies. 
C. Incommensurability
Incommensurability may be understood in three ways. Values are 
incommensurable in the sense that they are incomparable, immeasurable, and 
unrankable. Values are incomparable in the sense that they are so unalike as to 
exclude any reasonable comparison between them. Values are immeasurable 
in the sense that they cannot in any precise manner be weighed or measured 
against one another because they cannot be represented in terms of a common 
denominator of measurement. Value pluralism denies the possibility of any 
common denominator like utility, pleasure, or highest good (sumum bonum). 
Values are unrankable in the sense that they cannot be put in cardinal ranking 
such as ranking books according to the most copies sold. We cannot rank 
values like we rank all other things in our daily activities. 
D. Conflict
Values are in perpetual conflict. There are two sources of conflict. First, the 
ability of human beings to pursue or enjoy different values is constrained 
by empirical circumstances which impose limitations of various kinds and 
degrees. Our choices of values are forced upon us by circumstances that are, 
at least contemporarily, unchangeable. Second, some conflicts arise from 
the very nature of the values concerned. For instance, a life of independent, 
unencumbered self-reliance necessarily excludes a life dedicated to a large 
family and marital intimacy. This standpoint, of course, derives from a strong 
liberal position which values individualism above any other form of collective 
commitment.
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Value pluralism is an axiological fact which needs to be carefully understood. 
Failing to comprehend this may lead to two extremes. One is totalitarianism, 
and the other is relativism. When one believer tries to subordinate all values 
under his or her value-schemata, the result is totalitarianism. Isaiah Berlin 
traces the roots of totalitarianism to “a condition in which all values, desires, 
interests, and ultimately all persons are subordinated to a single overriding 
goal, either secular or religious” (Crowder 2000: 98). Fundamentalists have this 
kind of ideology in their minds. They use an instrumental type of reasoning 
to impose their faith-based-value-schemata as the only official one regardless 
of how heterogeneous existing faiths are. The value-schemata that they hold 
remain unexamined and never enter into enriching dialogues with others. 
The other extreme is relativism. Value pluralism may lead to anti-reason 
relativism. It means that values can never be judged independently by the 
standards of one particular belief. Every belief has its own rationality. There 
is no overarching rationality to measure any belief objectively. If two people 
disagree about a value-claim, they not only have different reasons for their 
claims, but also disagree about what is meant by “reason”. This kind of 
relativism is an obstacle to communication since a relativist can never engage 
in communication due to their instrumental form of action. Under the heading 
of value pluralism any communication a relativist engages in hides what is 
truly real: the instrumental reason. What relativists are trying to do is to impose 
their value by any means necessary. Still, their value remains unexamined 
under the vague mask called relativism. 
Habermas and occidental reason 
I feel that some modern philosophers insist that value pluralism requires 
political consensus. The transition from ordinary life to political life requires 
consensus on ultimate values upon which society is sustained. Consensus is 
needed since political life is a mode of living marked by plurality of values, 
conceptions of the good and ideals. This consensus, however, cannot be reached 
by imposition or coercion but through public reasoning by means of a practical 
mode of rationality. It must be made through public reasoning. The public 
way of reasoning is through practical mode of rationality. Philosopher John 
Rawls uses the term “public reason” as “a form of reasoning ... appropriate to 
equal citizens who as a corporate body impose rules on one another backed 
by sanctions of state power” (Rawls 2001: 92). Public reason does not promote 
specific associational values or principles but a public conception of justice. 
The opposite of public reason is the reason appropriate to individuals and 
associations within society. It guides how they can be quite properly deliberate 
in making their personal and associational decisions. Each association has 
its own form of reasoning which is related to its specific aims and purposes. 
Public reason, however, solely concerns the conception of justice all citizens 
accept regardless of their cultural or ideological backgrounds. 
Parallel with Rawls’ political consensus, German philosopher Jurgen 
Habermas also tries to secure the public sphere from communitarian or 
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sectarian values. In my opinion, Habermas believes that a deliberative 
process through public reason (which he calls communicative rationality) is 
guaranteed to realize the condition of “ideal speech situations” where coercion 
is substituted by argumentation. In such a situation, every participant can 
endorse a moral, scientific, or aesthetic proposition without being coerced to 
think otherwise. If all conditions are met, we would find generalizable interests 
which all those relevantly affected accept. Finding these interests demands 
individuals to step out of their private encapsulated fundamental values, 
culture, and tradition. In this case, Habermas’ communicative rationality goes 
against all forms of sectarian or context-bound rationality, because sectarian 
rationality knows only its own interest and refuses to communicate, and is 
thus unable to find generalizable interest.
Habermas’ point of departure is the same as that of most enlightenment 
philosophers: reason is defined by the critique of tradition and authority. As 
with his predecessors, Habermas tries to elucidate the nature of and conditions 
under which a normative kind of rationality is formed. He draws a clear line 
between cognitive-instrumental rationality and communicative rationality, 
between the capacity for a decentred perception and the manipulation of things 
or events and the capacity for reaching an intersubjective understanding about 
things or events (Habermas 1984: 14). Intersubjectivity is the political capacity 
for democratic participants as they must justify their action or belief to other 
political subjects. One cannot act or think without sharing with others for 
justification or one cannot justify one’s own action or thinking in isolation. A 
father who is about to send his son to school doesn’t need public justification. 
Meanwhile, it is mandatory for a governor who is about to convert a traditional 
market to a Mal to seek public justification before his policy is enacted. A 
Governor’s constituent is a political subject who demands an explanation for 
a Governor’s policy. A father’s son, however, is only a member of a family 
as a non-political institution. For me, communicative rationality ensures that 
communication can become a practical discourse which is ultimately a form of 
argumentation seeking consensual agreement. In this way, Habermas becomes 
a hard-headed proponent of a modern practical rationality that endorses the 
human capability to reflect on the consensual norm inherent in social action. 
Modern practical rationality belongs to the post-Renaissance European 
rationalistic tradition. Self-criticism is one of the most important features of 
this tradition. From Socrates to David Hume, philosophers subject all beliefs, 
claims, prejudices, and assumptions to the most rigorous scrutiny through 
the instruments of rationality, logic, and evidence. American philosopher 
John Searle lays down the five basic tenets of Western rationality tradition.1 
Searle’s first tenet is realism. Realism is the notion that there is a world “out 
there” that is totally free from our linguistic representations in the form of 
beliefs, experiences, statements, and theories. We are often so entrapped 
within our own representation (culture) that we cannot differentiate between 
representation and reality. Realism claims that we must use our reason to go 
1  See Searle 1993. 
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beyond mere representation to find the world as it is. 
The second tenet is correspondence. It claims that our statement or 
proposition must describe reality accurately. We adjudicate our propositions 
by measuring them against external reality. So, for example, the statement 
that hydrogen atoms have one electron, or that the earth is 93 million miles 
away from the sun is either true or false depending on whether or not things 
in the hydrogen atoms or solar system are really the way these statements 
say they are. In principle, a statement is true if, and only if, the statement 
corresponds to the facts. 
The third is objectivity. Our knowledge does not depend on or derives 
from the subjective attitudes and feelings of particular investigators. The 
objective truth or falsity of a claim made is totally independent of the motives, 
morality, gender, race, and ethnicity of the maker of that claim. The principle 
of objectivity denies the significance of culture in the process of knowledge 
creation. 
Formalism is the fourth tenet. According to the Western conception, 
rationality provides one with a set of procedures, methods, standards, and 
canons that enables one to assess various claims in light of competing claims. 
Central to this view is the Western conception of logic. Logic does not tell 
us what to believe. It only tells us what must be the case given that our 
assumptions are true, and hence what we are committed to believing given 
that we believe in those assumptions. 
The last tenet is anti constructivism. Intellectual standards are not 
culturally or socially constructed. They are either objective or intersubjective. 
These standards are objective in the sense that they are independent of the 
sensibilities of the people who apply the criteria and intersubjective in the 
sense that they are dependent. 
These tenets are interconnected. Knowledge is typically of a mind 
independent of reality. It is expressed in public language; it contains true 
propositions—these propositions are true because they accurately represent 
that reality—and knowledge is arrived at by applying, and is subject to, 
constraints of rationality and logic. The merits and demerits of theories are 
largely a matter of meeting or failing to meet the criteria implicit in this 
conception. This ideal, however, is now under attack. European philosophers 
such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Thomas Kuhn, and Paul Feyerabend 
question some Western rationalistic tradition’s claims such as universality, 
objectivity, and disinterestedness. In a pamphlet authored by six heads of 
prominent humanities institutes and issued by the American Council of 
Learned Societies, we read: “As the most powerful modern philosophies 
and theories have been demonstrating, claims of disinterest, objectivity and 
universality are not to be trusted and they tend to reflect local historical 
conditions.”2
Sociologist Gerard Delanty argues about the difficulties of Habermas’ 
communicative rationality. He believes that Habermas’ form of rationality 
2  See Levine et al. (1989: 18). 
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rests upon a particular cultural model namely occidental culture.3 Occidental 
culture itself is an expression of the universal features of civilized man. It is also 
a cultural norm to say that culture must not entrap or constrain individuals 
from thinking freely. Habermas’ communicative rationality shares occidental 
culture’s basic tenets. For instance, communicative rationality ensures that an 
individual can overcome his or her cultural constraints for the sake of public 
consensus. For Habermas, rationality is simply a universal procedure to settle 
sectarian disputes or conflicts. Guided by principles of rationality one will 
relativize one’s own way of life with regard to the legitimate claims of other 
forms of life. In this way, rationality does nothing but uproot individuals 
from their cultural tradition. 
The public sphere is unavoidably loaded with a multiplicity of cultural 
values. Habermas, however, emphasizes that cultural values do not yet in 
any way imply a claim that they would meet general assent within a culture, 
not to mention universal assent. Assent must be won by adopting a reflective 
attitude to our cultural values by making them intelligible to others by the 
force of reason. Habermas’ communicative rationality stresses that all norms 
should be able to be adjudicated rationally in the public sphere, which is 
neutral and anchored in the following assumptions: 
(a) Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part 
in a discourse.
(b) Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever.
(c) Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse. 
(d) Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires and needs.
(e) No speaker may be prevented by internal or external coercion, from exercising 
his or her rights as laid down above.
(Habermas 1999: 89). 
All cultural values, according to Habermas, must be moulded to meet 
the requirements above. The problem is that all these requirements are 
based on a certain cultural model which is occidental culture. This being so, 
it results in the imposition of a single cultural standard on the multiplicity 
of cultural values. The occidental cultural standards are impartiality, equal 
treatment, protection of fundamental rights, and self-criticism or reflectivity. 
These standards, however, cannot answer problems like cultural survival in 
a multicultural society. In Canada, for instance, Quebec’s Francophones or 
Quebeckers reacted against the Canadian Charter of Rights, which, while it 
defines a set of individual rights guaranteeing equal treatment regardless of 
race, sex, or other grounds, the Quebeckers maintain that the survival of their 
culture requires certain restrictions on precisely these rights. For example, 
French-speaking citizens are not allowed to send their children to English-
language schools, businesses of more than fifty employees should be run in 
French, and no commercial signs are to be written in English. 
These rules, however, may be perceived as discriminatory. Why should 
3  See Delanty 1997.  
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Francophones not be allowed to send their children to any schools they want 
provided they can afford it? Different from what Habermas has in mind, 
Quebeckers assume that the survival and flourishing of French culture in 
Quebec transcends rational adjudication. French culture is not to be scrutinized 
rationally but recognized as a legitimate demand for radical difference. 
Quebec’s French culture cannot be measured by occidental standards of 
impartiality, objectivity, and reflectivity. It demands, however, that these 
unrecognized standards be moulded to allow for the values of particular 
cultures and conceptions of the good. It demands not some occidental-driven 
rationality but a rationality that regards other culture as an important starting 
point for a mutually enriching dialog. 
Rationality and identity
Should reason uproot someone from their cultural identity? This becomes 
problematic since uprooting someone from his or her cultural identity is 
diametrically opposed to the multicultural condition of society. How then 
should we reason in multicultural society? One thing for sure, we should 
reason in a way that does not abstract ourselves and others from cultural 
values or traditions. We must, therefore, propose new forms of affiliation 
between rationality and identity; an affiliation which is more appropriate to 
multicultural society. 
We might learn from Charles Taylor’s differentiation between apodictic 
and ad hominem rationality (Taylor 1995: 36). Apodictic rationality is a 
way of reasoning which is based on a fundamental commitment to certain 
principles. This rationality constantly proposes criteria to make a decision 
among several contesting claims. Apodictic rationality decides upon an action 
to take based on external measurements (Taylor 1995: 37). For example, based 
on the apodictic rationality, Y is better than X because Y is supported by more 
accountable field data. Apodictic rationality is a transitional rationality, that is 
a rationality that guides us to shift from one choice (X) to another (Y) based on 
a certain criterion or principle. Based on this idea, Habermas’ communicative 
rationality is apodictic because it decides upon contesting cultural claims 
based on fundamental commitment to occidental culture. 
The second concept of rationality proposed by Charles Taylor proposes 
another concept of rationality, which is what he calls ad hominem rationality 
(Taylor 1995: 38). Different from apodictic rationality, ad hominem rationality 
is not based upon the fundamental commitment to a certain principle 
but departs from what becomes other people’s commitment, identity, or 
perspective. Instead of becoming an object of criticism based on a certain 
principle, other people’s commitment becomes the point of departure for a 
mutually enriching conversation. Note the following illustration: 
Someone used to refuse to greet his neighbour due to a religious difference. 
He did that based on his belief that befriending an infidel would lead him to 
religious deterioration. However, one day he could not avoid talking with 
the neighbour. From the conversation, he concluded that the neighbour was 
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a compassionate person. He reflected on his belief and asked himself: “Will 
such a compassionate person bring me into religious deterioration?” Reading 
from Taylor’s work, ad hominem rationality works by changing the agent’s 
wishes and preferences by minimizing the mistakes, which were manifest in 
his conversation with the neighbour.
Here the difference is clear between ad hominem and apodictic rationalities. 
Apodictic rationality intends to release an agent from the confinement of his 
private perspective by embracing a certain objective principle. Meanwhile, 
ad hominem rationality departs from other people’s commitment. However, 
the rationality of action which struggles with concrete individuals has no 
choice but to take other people’s identity into account. As shown above, the 
neighbour’s commitment to moderation and compassion becomes his point 
of departure to reflect on the fundamentalist’s rigid religious commitment. 
Ad hominem rationality requires an intense and concrete conversation 
between persons. Individuals can argue against each other to change each 
other’s wishes and preferences. The encounter with other people as concrete 
individuals is a new experience which can change or enrich one’s wishes 
and preferences. The change from one wish to another is not based on an 
external criterion but on an argumentation which considers other people’s 
commitment, perspective, or identity.
Identity itself should not be regarded as a constraint to rational reflectivity. 
According to Korsgaard, a normative question will not be asked by some 
impartial spectator but by someone who is troubled by such question. She 
argues: 
The normative question is a first person question that arises for the moral agent 
who must actually do what morality says. When you want to know what a 
philosopher’s theory of normativity is, you must place yourself in the position of 
agent on whom morality is making a difficult claim. You then ask the philosopher: 
must I really do this? Why must I do it? And his answer is his answer to the 
normative question (Korsgaard 1996: 16).
The answer to a normative question has to enable us to greet someone in 
his or her position as a first person. An agent considers whether he or she 
has to do something reasonable rationally or not. Moreover, the answer has 
to concern our identity-ness. An example is the moral decision to donate to 
charity. This decision is based not just on the principle of distributive justice 
which is general in nature but is instilled in the identity of the charity giver 
as a devout Muslim. 
I have some problems with Korsgaard’s standpoint. First, do I give alms 
just because of my practical identity as a Muslim? If so, the moral imperative 
to give alms becomes simply a conditional one. Secondly, how do I reconcile 
between a general characteristic of a principle of action with the particularity 
of practical identity? How does someone in his particularity support a general 
principle of action?
Korsgaard mentions that practical identity has inherently two meanings. 
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First of all, one’s practical identity can be understood as the condition of one’s 
particular identity. Second, practical identity is a general character which is 
inherent in one’s humanity. The authority of rationality in dictating an action, 
argues Korsgaard, shifts from being based on practical identity as a particular 
psychological fact to practical identity as a general character of agency which 
invites public’s commitment to action (Korsgaard 1996: 121) . 
Korsgaard declares that if reflectivity is a source of rationality, practical 
identity is a source of obligation (Korsgaard 1996: 102). Both are inter-
connected. Reading from Korsgaard work, a rational reason for action is not 
simply an abstract rule. A rational reason is an expression which represents 
one’s value and character. Practical identity is “a description by which one 
values herself, a description by which one finds that her life is worth living 
and her actions are worth doing” (Korsgaard 1996: 101).
Self-conception is possible due to reflective capacity which engenders 
rational reasons. We feel that we have obligations because we have a personal 
identity through which certain actions seem forbidden. A devout Muslim may 
think: “I cannot bear the embarrassment if I do not donate to charity.” One’s 
practical identity as a Muslim makes the action of “not giving charity” to have 
become forbidden and to contradict one’s self-conception as a Muslim. Basing 
myself on Korsgaard’s work, for me, our rational reason has a normative 
power because of two things. First, we attach authority to that reason through 
reflectivity. Second, our self-conception guides us – or even forces us – to act 
based on that conception in order to maintain a unified feeling of identity.
Concluding remarks
We do need to reason in multicultural society but we do it for the sake of 
cultural understanding, not universal consensus. Culture itself is a diacritical 
rather than a substantive concept. In Fredic Jameson words, “Culture is not 
a ‘substance’ or a phenomenon in its own right, it is an objective mirage that 
arises out of the relationship between at least two groups, no group ‘has’ a 
culture all by itself: culture is nimbus perceived by one group when it comes 
into contact with and observes another one” (Bennet 1998:  2).
Cultural understanding is needed when multicultural society transforms 
itself from sociological division to political contestation. Contestation might 
breed hatred and violence when reason is absent.  In such a situation, reason 
could be blinded by stereotypes, prejudices, or beliefs. This is the problem of 
divided society where universal assent is hardly possible. Habermas’ model 
of rationality pursues universal assent on a negotiable conflict over interests. 
A deeply divided society, however, is torn apart by zero-sum conflicts over 
fundamental values. Conflicts between the fundamental values of liberty and 
sanctity of life in the abortion issue cannot be easily negotiated and agreed. 
There are conflicts where cultural understanding, and not consensual 
agreement, could play an important role.  There two cases, one local and the 
other international, which can be conceived as exemplars of the success and 
failure of cultural understanding. First, the success story of Aceh. Indonesian-
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Aceh conflict was a good example of sustainable conflict coloured by deep 
seated prejudices and stereotypes. There was an absence of enforceable 
ethical commitment that can enhance the possibility of peace. On one hand, 
Aceh conceived Indonesian as Javanese imperialist. On the other hand, 
Indonesian conceived Aceh as separatist or anti NKRI (Unitary State of 
Indonesian Republic). Those prejudices had been deeply anchored in both 
parties collective consciousness that cancelled out every single attempt of 
reconciliation. In such situation, there was no room whatsoever for universal 
consensus. What happened during reconciliation process was each party tried 
to establish a mutual cultural understanding. Indonesian tried to understand 
Aceh separatism as product of their disappointment about centralization 
and militarization policy during Soeharto regime. Indonesian understood 
that once Aceh had committed to reconciliation during Soekarno regime. 
Their commitment was based upon the status “special autonomy to apply 
Islamic Sharia” given by Soekarno. This kind of cultural understanding was 
broken by Soeharto regime for economic reasons. What has been broken by 
Soeharto regime was re-established by Yudhoyono regime during Helsinski 
peace negotiation. Memorandum of Understanding signed in Helsinski by 
Indonesian and Aceh representatives was not a result of universal consensus 
but cultural understanding. 
Second, the failed case of French multicultural policy. The case of French 
revolved around the insistence of French Muslim women to wear headscarves 
in school from which they were subsequently suspended on refusing to comply 
with the regulations. This case reveals the necessity to distinguish between 
a politics of recognition and one of deliberation. French authority held that 
secularism is universally accepted by citizens of French. Unfortunately, 
secularism is truly French particular value derived from particular historical 
condition. The wearing of headscarves could not be defended in terms of 
Habermas’ occidental rationality, since the issue was about the problematical 
status of consensus itself. Habermas’ occidental rationality could actually be 
guilty of extreme intolerance against cultural traditional tradition, especially 
Islamic cultural tradition. 
Habermas’ occidental rationality could not account discursive resolution 
through cultural understanding.  Discursive resolution could only come about 
when cultural traditions have first become reflective. Cultural reflectivity is 
possible when each cultural tradition tries to discursively encounter others. In 
order to do so, each cultural tradition must not adopt occidental-abstract model 
of rationality that decontextualizes discursive participant from his or her 
cultural embeddedness.  Instead, each cultural tradition should adopt other-
regarding mode of rationality that takes into account others’ commitment, 
perspective, or identity.
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